Thinking with You, Niyi Akinnaso, niyi.tlc@gmail.com
Hillary Clinton did not win. And so, she
never succeeded in becoming the first female President of the United
States of America. Therefore, you can go ahead and blame me all you want
for going all out for her in the US presidential election of November
8, 2016. I share the blame with thousands of pollsters, journalists, and
editorial writers across the globe. I also share it with over 60
million Americans, who voted for her, believing strongly that she would
win.
History was made quite alright. But it
was not the kind of history some of us had anticipated. That’s why the
critical question this week is what kind of history was made and what
are its implications?
Donald Trump made history both as the
richest man to become President and the oldest man in that office on
first inauguration, when he would be in his 71st year. Besides, he would
be the second person in American history to become President without
either serving in the military or holding public office. But these facts
pale in comparison to the far-reaching national and international
dimensions of his victory. Those, to me, are the lessons of history to
be learned from Trump’s victory.
At the domestic level, Trump’s victory
was a victory for nationals vs immigrants (never mind that the nationals
were themselves descendants of immigrants); rural vs urban America; the
working class as well as struggling middle class vs the elite; and the
outsider vs the establishment.
Throughout the primaries, Trump ran as
an outsider against his own party’s establishment candidates, and won.
We should have seen it coming, when he ran against the Democratic
Party’s establishment candidate in the general election.
Trump earned his victory by stoking
people’s fears and anxieties about the future as he aimed his campaign
at the White working and struggling middle classes, especially in rural
America, many of whom had lost manufacturing jobs and are not skilled in
new technology jobs. Most have no college degree and are, therefore,
difficult to retrain. Most of them are White.
Politically, these differences translate
to race and identity as the dividing line in American politics, which
roughly matches the ideological divide between the two major parties. On
the one hand, rural America, which voted overwhelmingly for Trump, is
White and inward-looking. On the other hand, urban America, which voted
for Clinton, is diverse and cosmopolitan.
Rural America responded well to Trump’s
anti-globalisation message in much the same way as they responded to his
anti-immigration message, believing that immigrants took their jobs. He
would create new jobs, “lots of jobs”, he said, by stopping outsourcing
and bringing manufacturing back to their backyard.
In the process, he promised to build a
wall across the Mexican border and deport illegal immigrants. He would
impose heavy taxation on companies that outsource jobs in order to force
them to bring those jobs back and discourage them from further
outsourcing. He would block Muslim immigration or vet Muslim applicants
intensively. He would defeat ISIS and fight terrorism to the death.
Even more importantly, he successfully
painted Clinton as a “liar”, a “nasty woman” and an elitist, who
romances Wall Street and financial institutions, collecting high
speaking fees. Above all, he painted her as untrustworthy, citing her
email scandal, and promised to put her in jail.
To further stoke his supporters’ fears,
he spoke of a vast conspiracy against him and them by some faceless
global elite, media organisations, financial institutions, the federal
government, and even his own party leadership. “You must take your
country back from them”, he told supporters.
It was all music to the ears of rural
America, especially in the so-called Rust Belt, encompassing about 10
states, stretching from northern New York and Pennsylvania through Ohio
and Michigan to southeastern Wisconsin, where economic decline,
population loss, and urban decay followed the shrinking of its
once-powerful industrial sector. It was no accident that Trump won
virtually all these states.
What was hardly realised during the
campaign, and which pollsters never really captured, was the cumulative
effect on voters in the Rust Belt of Trump’s repeated campaign against
immigration, globalisation, free trade agreements, and the outsourcing
of the US jobs. On further reflection, it occurred to me that Trump’s
campaign slogan, “Make America great again”, was a code for “Make
America White again”.
How then did pollsters and media
organisations miss these fine points? It became clear after the election
that many pollsters and media organisations used data from Obama’s 2008
and 2012 campaigns as the benchmark, forgetting that Obama was not on
the ticket. This was evident, for example, in the CNN’s election
coverage, which made repeated references to the Obama coalition.
Besides, their data were largely skewed
in favour of urban America. The case of Pennsylvania is particularly
instructive. True, Clinton won handily by a margin of nearly four to one
in Philadelphia and surrounding suburban counties, but whatever she
gained in these urban counties were offset by Trump’s votes from rural
Pennsylvania counties as vote counting went on. It would be so
throughout the country, except the blue states along the West Coast,
which stood by Clinton.
The gullibility of rural voters speaks
to a deep gap in American education that is often missed. According to
the 2010 census data, less than 40 per cent of Americans hold a college
degree. Educational attainment in the Rust Belt is even much less than
the national average, which explains why voters there took Trump’s
campaign seriously, believing in his promises.
What was equally missed were the
international dimensions of Trump’s campaign and eventual victory.
European politicians on the far right, from the Balkans to the
Netherlands, applauded Trump’s election as a radical restructuring of
the political landscape, even beyond the United States.
For them, the pro-globalisation and
pro-immigration consensus, promoted by mainstream politicians and the
media, has been overturned by the politics of heightened nationalism,
immigrant-bashing and anti-globalisation. That’s why many far-right
politicians were gladdened by Trump’s victory. This includes those
already in office, like Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary, and
those seeking office, like Ms. Marine Le Pen of France and Geert Wilders
of the Netherlands.
Again, back home to the United States,
while Republicans were gloating in Trump’s victory, the outcome was
quite disruptive for the Democratic Party establishment and Democrats in
general. Some voters, especially minorities, millennials, and urban
women, took their frustration, fear, and disillusionment to the streets
in protest against Trump’s election.
With Obama going out of office in
January and the Clintons decimated by defeat, a leadership crisis looms
in the party. Donna Brazile, interim Chair of the Democratic National
Committee, and her successor have their job cut out for them.
The emergent party leadership must work
harder on getting the voters out in subsequent elections, beginning with
the midterm election in 2018. Data from the recent presidential
election show that Democratic voters didn’t come out enough. True, about
47 per cent of registered voters didn’t vote at all; but more than half
of them are registered Democrats. A higher turnout of Democratic voters
would have upset the negative effect of the reopening of Clinton’s
email investigation some 11 days before election by the FBI Director,
James Comey.
While Democrats engage in soul
searching, Donald Trump will be inaugurated as the 45th President of the
United States on Friday, January 20, 2017. With Republicans in charge
in the White House and Congress, the future of Obamacare, that is, the
Affordable Care Act, and the composition of the Supreme Court is up in
the air. But also up in the air is whether Trump’s presidency will be
the beginning of the rise or the decline of America’s influence around
the world.
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